Defense Pacific

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted a discussion on October 27, 2022 at 4:00 p.m. ET, on the most critical takeaways for U.S. defense policy to deal with China and the Indo-Pacific, as detailed in the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).

defense pacific

Please join PNDC for a fun-filled networking happy hour! This in-person networking event is a great opportunity for you to engage with PNDC Members and other businesses in the defense/security industry. There will be ample time to mingle, have some good food and refreshments. We hope to see you there!

The Aegis system is deployed on 17 U.S. Navy destroyers and cruisers in the region that conduct ballistic missile tracking, targeting, and engagement capability. These Aegis BMD ships can engage short-(SRBMs), medium- (MRBMs), and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in either the midcourse or terminal phase of flight. They can also contributed to the defense of the U.S. homeland by detecting and tracking of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sending this data to Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) based in Alaska and California to engage.

Japan has heavily invested in an integrated BMD system and has focused on midcourse defense with the Aegis system. Japan operates four Aegis BMD ships with plans to build four more by the early 2020s. The cabinet in December 2017 approved a plan to build two Aegis Ashore sites by the early 2020s. U.S. Aegis ships and U.S. and Japanese Patriot batteries offer another layer of defense.

We remain committed to peace and prosperity through the region in order to secure a free and open Indo-Pacific. More Details 221006-N-DW158-1038 WATERS BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN (Oct 6, 2022) Ships from the U.S., Japan and Republic of Korea conducted a trilateral ballistic missile defense exercise in the waters between Korea and Japan, Oct. 6. The ships included Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) and Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65) (not pictured), part of the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers JS Chokai (DDG 176) and JS Ashigara (DDG 178) (not pictured), and Republic of Korea Navy destroyer ROKS Sejong the Great (DDG 991) and demonstrated the strength of the trilateral relationship and the interoperability of U.S., Japanese and ROK collective forces. Chancellorsville provided air defense to the units as they conducted the ballistic missile exercise, which includes, detecting, tracking, and intercepting simulated targets, as well as coordination, communication, and information-sharing between the three countries. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gray Gibson) $(document).ready(function () var fbCaption = $('.afb-caption-6397520').html(); $(".fancybox-6397520").attr("data-caption", fbCaption); ); U.S., Japan, and the Republic of Korea Conduct a Trilateral Ballistic Missile Defense Exercise 221006-N-DW158-1038 WATERS BETWEEN KOREA AND JAPAN (Oct 6, 2022) Ships from the U.S., Japan and Republic of Korea conducted a trilateral ballistic missile defense exercise in the waters between Korea and Japan, Oct. 6. The ships included Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Chancellorsville (CG 62) and Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Benfold (DDG 65) (not pictured), part of the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyers JS Chokai (DDG 176) and JS Ashigara (DDG 178) (not pictured), and Republic of Korea Navy destroyer ROKS Sejong the Great (DDG 991) and demonstrated the strength of the trilateral relationship and the interoperability of U.S., Japanese and ROK collective forces. Chancellorsville provided air defense to the units as they conducted the ballistic missile exercise, which includes, detecting, tracking, and intercepting simulated targets, as well as coordination, communication, and information-sharing between the three countries. (U.S. Navy Photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gray Gibson) SHARE IMAGE: var addthis_config = data_use_flash: false, data_use_cookies: false, ui_508_compliant: true Download Image Image Details Photo By: Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Gray Gibson VIRIN: 221006-N-DW158-1053

Gen. Lori J. Robinson, right, the Pacific Air Forces commander, meets with Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani during his visit to PACAF at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, Nov. 24, 2015. Nakatani and members of his defense forces were here to conduct bilateral talks with U.S. Pacific Command and PACAF leaders about ongoing and future operations in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. (U.S. Air Force photo/Tech. Sgt. Amanda Dick)

Col. David Moeller, the 613th Air Operations Center commander, greets Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani during his visit to the center Nov. 23, 2015, at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii. Nakatani and members of his defense forces were here to conduct bilateral talks with U.S. Pacific Command and PACAF leaders about ongoing and future operations in the pacific. (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Alexander Martinez)

A common view among defense leaders is that the most effective way to deter China is to credibly demonstrate the ability to prevail in a conventional conflict.7 From this viewpoint, the DoD needs to more narrowly focus its investments on core military missions in the Indo-Pacific. Achieving this goal in an era of constrained resources means prioritizing the sustainment of U.S. military technological advantage over China, developing new operational concepts, focusing joint training and exercising on high-end conflict, investing in a more resilient force posture, and preserving readiness by limiting certain kinds of steady state activity.

This points to a fundamental question for U.S. defense strategy: In a theater in which a large-scale conventional war is possible, but less likely than competition below the level of armed conflict or short, limited hostilities, what is the right balance between deterring high-end conflict and countering coercion of U.S. allies? This is not to suggest that the United States should not and will not need to do both. But the investments and posture needed to deter conventional conflict and gray zone aggression are not necessarily aligned. For example, should DoD double down on investments in hypersonic weapons or next generation aviation? They help to ensure continued U.S. military technological superiority, but they are expensive and may not be necessary in a limited conflict. Or do increased U.S. presence operations and joint engagements with allies in the South China Sea provide greater relative value in deterring Chinese aggression? If so, this approach also has implications for force design, potentially requiring more smaller ships and ground forces.

In the near term, one of the most consequential and affordable steps that the Department of Defense can take to shore up the conventional military balance in East Asia is to reduce the vulnerability of American forces to Chinese air and missile attacks by distributing them across more locations and putting in place a system of passive defenses on existing bases. Doing so would introduce uncertainty that China could cripple U.S. forces with a first strike and thereby strengthen deterrence.

Passive defenses minimize the damage of an attack by improving the ability of the target to withstand a strike, recover, and continue critical military operations. This may include dispersing forces across multiple locations, spreading forces and equipment out on a base, hardening, redundancy, camouflage, concealment, deception, early warning systems, and recovery capabilities, such as civil engineers, to rapidly repair the damage from an attack and restore operations. Decades of RAND research has demonstrated that passive defenses greatly improve the survivability of U.S. aircraft and are useful against a range of threats from swarms of drones to ballistic and cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons. Ideally, one wants a diverse portfolio of active and passive defensive measures, which reduces the probability that an attack succeeds. Yet the U.S. military is overfocused on active defenses, such as surface-to-air missiles, electronic warfare, and defensive combat air patrols, which seek to intercept and neutralize a threat before it reaches its target. Passive defenses offer an affordable and effective way to counter a range of threats to U.S. bases and forces, but they lack strong advocates in the services, Congress, and industry and thus tend to be overlooked in favor of active defenses.

There are two courses of action that the Defense Department should pursue in the Indo-Pacific to bolster passive defenses in the region. First, it should gain access to more bases and make infrastructural improvements to existing ones in the first island chain and in more distant locations to enable distributed operations. Second, it should employ multiple types of passive defenses on existing and new bases. It may appear that the Defense Department is already undertaking these actions, but an examination of the defense budget reveals little real progress in these areas.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, or ASD (IPSA), is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of DoD interest that relate to the governments and defense establishments of the nations and international organizations within the Asia-Pacific region.[1] The position was originally titled Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs but was renamed by the Trump Administration alongside the renaming of the United States Indo-Pacific Command.[2]

DASDs are appointed by the Secretary of Defense. Some are appointed from civilian life, while others are career defense officials. Once at the DASD level, the latter are considered a part of the DoD Senior Executive Service. 041b061a72